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Can China Go High-Tech When Exports Slump?
March 12, 2009 in In Case You Missed It by The China Beat | 3 comments

By Yu Zhou
As the financial Tsunami batter China’s exporting hubs, everyone is wondering how well China can
weather the storm in the next couple of years, but a more important question is how China’s economy
will emerge after the crisis. As a result of extensive research, I argue that there have been sustained
forces pushing China’s industry to more innovative fields with a stronger orientation to the domestic
market. The crisis will only strengthen the shift in a more dramatic manner.
This conclusion is based on my research in Beijing’s Zhongguancun, a region dedicated to innovative
industry and domestic market. I started to do research in Beijing’s Zhongguancun in 2000, at a time
when few foreigners had ever heard of the place. But most Chinese had, due to the hype from the
official media that Zhongguancun was going to become China’s Silicon Valley. Yet, knowledgeable

Chinese knew that Silicon Valley had grown up
around such
technology giants as Intel, HP, or Google. Zhongguancun, in contrast, seemed to be a collection of
gigantic electronic markets and untold numbers of venders parading pirated CDs. They are very
skeptical of this government claim.
Undaunted, I continued to collect information and interview all sorts of companies in Zhongguancun,
private, foreign-owned, state-owned, returnees owned, and I found that there indeed was more to
Zhongguancun than meets the eyes. I had grown up in this region in the 1980s and witnessed its first
transformation from a quiet suburb of universities and research institutes to a bustling high-tech
commercial center. By 2000, it was gathering energy again with the internet boom. My fascination and
research in this region lasted for six years and resulted in a book: The Inside Story of China’s HighTech Industry: Making Silicon Valley in Beijing. Today, Zhongguancun is still far from Silicon Valley,
but it has put its name on the international map. A number of companies started there have gained
international attention, such as Lenovo and Baidu, and venture capitalists from California flood into
China’s most promising land for innovative business today.
In my book, I challenge the prevailing view that foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and export
are the driving forces for technological progress in China. I argue that indigenous companies are likely
to be the future technological leaders in China. The most successful of them have taken advantage of
their understanding of the Chinese market with their access to competitive, reliable, and high-quality
component suppliers—the same suppliers for MNCs in exports. The synergy between China’s massive
export facilities and rapid growing domestic market allowed Chinese companies to make special
designs, pricing and marketing methods that worked best within China to beat foreign brands
competition. This is the common story of Lenovo, Huawei and many other successful Chinese hightech companies.

More significantly, the growth of Zhongguancun is not marked by the emergence of a few strong
firms, but by succeeding generations of them. The first wave was the spin-offs from universities and
research institutes in the mid 1980s. These were primitive commercial companies with extremely
limited international contact. But they managed to take over the lead of China’s high-tech commercial
development from state-owned sectors, and firmly set China in the global technological mainstream.
The second generation was computer hardware manufacturing firms such as Lenovo, which was able
to establish its domestic leadership amid strong foreign competition in the mid 1990s. These were
followed by internet startups in the late 1990s to 2000s, which to this day dominate China’s internet
market in every category.
The current wave is much more diverse, including multimedia firms, chip design, software export and
other more technically sophisticated companies, often started up by overseas returnees with overseas
venture capital. Each generation has gained more technical, management and capital competence,
and each followed more closely the tidal waves of the Chinese market and global technological trends.
Zhongguancun’s development is a fascinating story, with many colorful characters and successions of
generations over a brief period and, though my book is academic in nature, I have attempted to
capture this lively story with ethnographic details that heighten the book’s readability.
For those who would like to learn more, I summarize below some of the conclusions from my book:
1. Foreign multinational firms (MNCs) have limits in bringing technological transformation
in China. Chinese firms have a competitive edge in their home market.
We often assume that if a large multinational company, say HP or Google, are successful in America
and elsewhere, then they should also be successful in China. If they are not, we blame the Chinese
government for creating an unlevel playing field between Chinese and foreign firms. But the reality is
that China is a vast, regionally fragmented, rapidly evolving and largely low-income market. It is
challenging for MNCs to reach beyond China’s affluent core. In contrast, Chinese domestic firms
understand their home court better and have greater commitment and flexibility. They are also
learning fast from MNCs in China. While they certainly are not on the cutting-edge, they have been
extraordinarily effective in bringing new technology to the Chinese market at an affordable price. Their
learning ability should not be underestimated.
2. The key constraint for Chinese companies to produce cutting-edge innovation is the
Chinese market, but this will change.
Many believe that the lack of innovation by Chinese companies has to do with their low R&D capacity.
This is only partly true. It is worthwhile to remember that almost all Chinese technological companies
were built after the mid 1980s—which is when China’s technological industry began. Most have
emerged only in the 1990s. The short history set them apart from existing business powerhouses in
Japan, South Korea, and even India.
But beyond the inexperience and capital and technical gap, the key constraint for Chinese companies
to innovate is the Chinese market. Michael Porter in his bookThe Competitiveness Advantage of
Nations argues that it is the quality of the domestic market that is critical for national competitiveness.
A technologically sophisticated market pushes innovation by forcing companies to constantly upgrade
their products. Yet Chinese consumers value low-price and lack experiences with many products. This
means that most have yet to attach the same importance to the quality, design, and newness of
products that consumers in advanced economies do. This provides little incentive and reward for
cutting-edge innovation by domestic companies.
It is not surprising, indeed it should be expected, that most Chinese companies concentrate on
following the MNCs’ lead in making products cheaper and better suited to Chinese customers rather
than blazing their own paths. But as the market evolves with sustained higher income and more
sophisticated consumer tastes, one can bet that Chinese companies will evolve with it by offering
more innovative products.
3. The competition between Chinese indigenous firms and MNCs is not a zero sum game.
Observers inside and outside China tend to view the competition between MNCs and domestic firms as
one side trying to eat the other’s lunch. But the prevailing pattern is actually a relationship of

collaboration. Virtually no Chinese products are made without MNCs’ components. This is true for
hardware and software. China’s most popular enterprise management software by UFIDA, a domestic
company, has an Oracle database in it. As domestic companies cultivate and expand the market,
MNCs have an enlarged consumer base for their products.
MNCs also learned from local firms’ marketing expertise to enhance their market performance. For
example, when Nokia and Motorola suffered setbacks from Chinese cell phone manufactures in 200204, they managed to regain the high-end of the market by adjusting marketing strategies in part
modeled after local competitors. Overall, the increasing involvement of MNCs in China in the past
twenty years has been accompanied by, and indeed dependent upon the growing competence of
Chinese local companies.
Some Chinese critics lament the lack of innovation in China and they imagine that if only Chinese
scientists put their minds to innovation with ample state funding, innovation would take place. The
truth is that given globalization and the lagging state of China, domestic companies cannot generate
new technology unless they work with MNCs. Only MNCs can demonstrate how technology, marketing,
and human resources are managed in the modern world. They provide Chinese companies with the
knowledge of rules and skills the Chinese market has yet to provide. The technological dynamics
displayed by returnee-founded enterprises nowadays exemplify how indispensible the international
linkages are for cutting-edge innovation in China.
4. The critical role of the Chinese state is not to lead technological change, but to be an
honest and responsible collaborating partner with other technological agents.
Analysts tracking Chinese technological changes often regard the Chinese state as the decisive actor.
Outside China, China’s success in economic development is frequently credited to the Chinese state
policies, and Chinese failure in creating frontier technology breakthroughs is also blamed on its
authoritarian system. Within China, some Chinese scholars believe that China has become too
dependent on Western technology and China’s private sector is incapable of moving into long-term
R&D, so they advocate a more direct role for the state. It is not uncommon to hear Chinese officials
referring to China’s success in producing nuclear bombs and a satellite in the 1960s as a model for
technological breakthroughs. Unfortunately, this argument shows little understanding of the difference
between military and civilian technology, or of the reality of the global marketplace in which Chinese
companies must operate. A nuclear bomb does not have to stand the test of open global competition;
a computer chip does. China’s state-directed satellite and technology research prior to the mid-1980s
had a very poor record in responding to market needs. Given the intensity of globalization today, a
state-centered approach to R & D would be counterproductive, if not simply unfeasible.
This is not to deny that the role of the state is instrumental. In China, as in other developing
countries, the question is never whether the state should play a role in technological development,
but how. Zhongguancun’s experience shows us the state’s crucial roles are not in being leaders, but in
collaborating effectively with other technological agents and learning to reform regional institutions
under changed circumstances. The accomplishments of China’s Silicon Valley thus far cannot be
attributed primarily to the Chinese government.
Domestic companies and MNCs alike have spent considerable energy pushing the state to change its
resource allocation, ease its restrictions, and alter its regulations. Over the years, the Chinese state
has largely been responsive and tolerant of the various experiments in the region, setbacks
notwithstanding. But the state has not gone far enough. In the long run, genuine innovation can only
come from freedom of thought, experimentation, collective effort, and frequent exchanges with
advanced technological parties and marketplaces. All that will require the Chinese government to
continue to collaborate with—rather than supervise or direct—other parties. Only then can a fairer and
more open institutional structure for fostering innovation can be built.
China’s path into high-tech will not be easy, but one should never underestimate the capacity of
Chinese enterprises in learning and competing in their domestic market, which will eventually move
them toward a more innovative trajectory.
Yu Zhou teaches geography at Vassar College.

